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1 Introduction 
In recent years, state and local governments in the United States, directly 
and through public universities, have invested millions of dollars in research 
parks1 , for land, buildings, specialized equipment, utilities, and other infra-
structure. Sizable investments have been made, as well, by private universi-
ties, non-profit foundations, and private developers. These different types of 
investors have somewhat different objectives. But all share the belief that re-
search parks will stimulate regional economic development by attracting and 
nurturing innovation-oriented businesses, and thereby alter the area's econo-
mic structure and long-term performance. This belief apparently is shared 
by developers, university administrators, and government officials in other 
countries, particularly in Europe, since science parks have sprouted there, as 
well. 
This widespread belief has never been questioned seriously. Yet, for se-
veral reasons, research parks may not always live up to their promise. If that 
is the case, the proliferation of research parks in the 1980s is a public policy 
problem that deserves some attention2 • 
In this paper we critically assess the use of public funds to develop rese-
arch parks in the United States, using results from a two-year study funded 
by the Ford Foundation. We first provide a profile of the research parks that 
currently exist in the United States. We then describe briefly the types of 
investments made in research parks by state and local governments, univer-
sities, and other key actors, and the motivations for those investments. The 
next section of the paper explains the hypothetical basis for the widespread 
belief that research parks are sound investments. We then test these hy-
potheses using two types of evidence: from a case study of the Research 
Triangle Park, an early and well-known "success" located in North Carolina, 
and from an analysis of data from samples of counties with and without 
research parks, using quasi-experimental and econometric techniques. We 
conclude by summarizing our findings and drawing some lessons for public 
policy. 
1These are referred to as research, science, and technology parks in different parts of the 
world. For convenience, we use the term "research parks" as a general reference. 
2The number of research parks has multiplied threefold since 1982. Of the 110 or so 
parks that exist in 1989, approximately 70 percent are less than eight years old. 
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It is important to note that our conclusions do not necessarily apply 
to science parks outside the U.S., though we suspect there are numerous 
similarities. We are currently collecting data from those parks to conduct a 
cross-national comparison. 
2 A Profile of U.S. Research Parks 
Research parks are business parks in which the primary activity of the ma-
jority of resident establishments is basic or applied research, or new product 
or process development, rather than manufacturing, sales, headquarters, or 
other business functions. Typically, the proportion of a park's workforce who 
are scientists or engineers with graduate degrees is used as a proxy for re-
search and development activity. Defined in this way, research parks are to 
be distinguished from spatial concentrations of technology-oriented activity 
that are not organized as a single legal entity, such as the route 128 corridor 
in Massachusetts. They are also to be distinguished from technology centers 
and incubators. The former, often university-based, are principally involved 
with the coordination of technological development and the management of 
technology transfer. Incubators are buildings that house small, start-up bu-
sinesses. They may also include services that new businesses need, but often 
cannot afford by themselves. Technology centers and incubators sometimes 
exist within research parks. 
We often envision research "parks" as broad expanses of greenspace inter-
rupted by cleanly designed low-rise buildings along curving roads in a cam-
pus environment. Indeed, the most prominent U.S parks, including those 
at Stanford University, the Research Triangle in North Carolina, and the 
University of Utah, have those characteristics and may be responsible for 
the popular image. There are, however, a variety of physical park confi-
gurations, including relatively small, inner city developments that contain 
multi-story, converted factory or warehouse buildings (for example, the New 
Haven Science Park in Connecticut). 
One-third of the U.S. parks contain incubator space for small, start-up 
organizations. This low percentage is in contrast to non-U.S. science parks 
which place a higher priority on new technology development and incubation 
(see, foe example, Allesch and Fiedler, 1985; Gibb, 1985; and Sternberg, 
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1988). 
Regardless of their configuration, parks typically use planning controls to 
regulate the use of land or buildings. That practice distinguishes parks from 
other possible business location sites in the same region. The use of deed 
restrictions (in 81.5 percent of the parks surveyed) preserves the character of 
the park by outlawing certain types of activity - mostly heavy manufactu-
ring, residential, and warehousing3 • Ninety percent of the parks we surveyed 
also regulated the "footprint," or the ratio of the building's ground floor area 
to the lot size, and 56.6 percent imposed a minimum lot size requirement4 • 
These limitations often make the total cost of locating in a park substan-
tial. As a result, many businesses, particularly new start-ups, are priced 
out of research parks, unless they have access to venture capital or business 
incubators, as discussed above. 
In three case studies conducted as part of our Ford Foundation-sponsored 
project (Research Triangle Park, University of Utah, and Stanford), we found 
average per acre land values inside the parks to be somewhat lower than for 
equivalent sites outside the parks. In at least two of the cases, we attribute 
this observation to a capitalization of the higher total development costs due 
to planning and land use controls into lower property values5 • Of course, 
this negative capitalization is partially offset by a positive capitalization of 
prestige and the protected milieu referred to above. 
The value of research park land, like the value of business sites in general, 
varies significantly from place to place. Five parks in our sample (in Maclean 
(VA), Philadelphia, Tampa, Dallas, and Princeton) commanded more than 
$250,000 per acre. At the other extreme, land in a park in upstate Michigan 
sold last year for approximately $10,000 per acre. 
The large majority of parks (85 percent) are located in metropolitan 
regions. Forty-five percent of these metropolitan parks ( or 38 percent of the 
3 Ninety-four percent of the parks in our sample of 66 parks prohibited heavy manufac-
turing, 85 percent prohibited residential uses, 77 percent outlawed warehousing, 59 percent 
forbade retail and consumer services, and 30 percent prohibited light manufacturing. 
4The thirty parks with minimum lot size requirements were distributed as follows: less 
than 1.1 acre (9), 1.1 to 2.5 acres (9), 2.6 to 5 acres (10), more than 5 acres (2). 
5In the Stanford case, the lower land values within the park are due mostly to an early 
practice of granting longterm belowmarket rate leases, as a locational inducement. In the 
early years of the Stanford Research Park, there were restrictive land use covenants but few 
other limitations. 
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total) are in regions with over 1,000,000 population (1985 Census estimates). 
Parks are located in all geographic regions of the country, although the South 
is somewhat over-represented and the West is somewhat under-represented. 
Parks that have been created since 1982 are more likely to be located in 
either the largest metropolitan centers or in non-metropolitan areas. 
Nearly 25 percent of U.S. parks are units of public or private universities. 
Another 60 percent of research parks have a formal or informal affiliation 
with nearby research or doctoral-granting universities, even though they are 
not owned by them. Most of the remaining 15 percent of parks that do not 
have an institutional affiliation with a university have interactions between 
employees in their resident organizations and a nearby university's faculty 
members. 
The 75 percent of parks that are not units of a university are divi-
ded among six organizational types. Twenty-three percent of parks are 
university-private sector joint ventures. Parks also are for-profit corpora-
tions (approximately 15 percent of the total), units of state government (8 
percent of total), local government ventures (8 percent of total), and not-
for-profit private organizations (23 percent )6. Over one-half of all parks have 
some government affiliation, either through a public university or as a unit 
of a state or municipality. 
3 Reasons for Investing in Research Parks 
Research park investments are made by different actors, for different reasons. 
• Private investors. One type of investment in research parks is by pri-
vate individuals who provide equity to a development company for the 
purchase of land, site improvements, marketing, and other expenses7 • 
This includes venture capitalists8 • These investors view research parks 
as a real estate venture with the potential to generate positive net cash 
flow and capital appreciation. This group of financiers typically is less 
6Based on a sample of 66 research parks. 
7We exclude from discussion here the role of institutions that provide debt finance. 
8 Approximately 10 percent of our sample of park developers used venture capital, and 
34 percent of our sample of park occupants used venture capital to finance their startup 
operations. 
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interested in the research and technology orientation of park occupants, 
than they are with the economic viability of the park. Consequently, if 
the research park is not sufficiently profitable, many private investors 
lobby park management for a relaxation of park land use restrictions, 
so office, commercial, warehousing, and even manufacturing activity 
could locate there (Goldstein and Luger, 1989a). 
• Park management. The park management itself invests in infrastruc-
ture, facilities, and services for its occupants, using private funds (if the 
park is a for-profit corporation), university or state-local government 
contributions, special assessments, and/or internally-generated funds, 
from current or projected land sales or rentals. 
First, park management makes investments that relate to the imme-
diate physical environment and facilities of individual resident organiza-
tions, including the construction of multi-tenant buildings that provide 
space for service, office, and small R&D enterprises; the provision of 
sewer and water service (82.8 percent of parks); the construction and 
maintenance of roadways (78.1 percent of parks); gas hookups (71.9 
percent of parks); ground maintenance and landscaping (70.3 percent 
of parks); signage (70.3 percent of parks); land use planning (62.5 per-
cent of parks); and security services (45.3 percent of parks). 
Second, park management often provides business services for the con-
venience of the resident organizations. These include conference and 
meeting facilities (39.1 percent of parks surveyed); an on-site hotel (26.6 
percent of parks); management consulting (25 percent of parks); and 
restaurant, recreation, and child care facilities (32.8 percent of parks). 
Third, park management often acts as a liaison on behalf of the occu-
pants, with other institutions in the area, including universities (84.4 
percent of the parks) and state and local governments (66 percent). 
Park managers make these investments because other actors have not 
taken the responsibility (especially in the case of infrastructure); be-
cause resident businesses could not undertake them themselves, at least 
as efficiently9 ; and/or with the expectation that the investments will 
91n the case of small, new firms, often in higher density, urban areas, parks provide 
services and facilities at lower cost to the individual business because the concentration 
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make the park more attractive to organizations, and hence, increase 
the site rent they can charge10• 
• State and local government. State and local governments provide di-
rect and indirect subsidies to businesses and park developers with the 
justification that the parks will serve to stimulate regional employment 
growth and well-paying jobs for local university graduates11 • This mo-
tivation recently has been strongest in stagnant and declining areas of 
the country. 
The most prevalent ( and costly) form of government investment is 
the provision of infrastructure to or within parks: access roads, new 
highway interchanges, and water and sewer lines, for example. In some 
cases, state or local governments also abate property taxes for busines-
ses within the park (in approximately 26 percent of the parks surveyed), 
dedicate public lands for park use (21 percent of parks surveyed)12 , lease 
or purchase properties within the parks for government use (20 percent 
of respondents), and construct facilities within the parks (15 percent 
of respondents). These government-constructed facilities often serve as 
"anchors," or symbols of stability for prospective tenants13 • 
• Universities. Universities invest in research parks for two reasons. In 
several cases, universities act as a real estate developer and manager on 
land they already have in their portfolio. The best known example of 
this is the Stanford Research Park. Leland Stanford had bequeathed 
considerable amounts of land as part of his endowment of Stanford 
University, with the stipulation that it never be sold. Following World 
War II, the trustees decided to lease the land to local industries as a 
of businesses with similar needs creates economies of scale. This is the concept behind 
incubators. It also illustrates what we refer to below as "localization economies." 
10In some cases, parks are governed by occupants who decide how to spend at least a 
portion of the park corporation's funds. 
11 Based on interviews with state and local officials in the three case study areas. 
12The parks to which this applies are state or municipallyowned or part of a public 
university. 
13 Another important state activity is the creation of special park districts, protecting the 
parks from municipal annexation. Park occupants then pay no city taxes. They either 
purchase services from nearby municipalities or have them provided by the park manager. 
This legislation has been passed for approximately 10 percent of the parks. 
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way to generate revenues for the university. They employed planners 
to recommend land use controls that would protect the university from 
negative side-effects from this development14 • 
In other cases, universities have bought land to develop as a research 
park, or have kept land bequeathed to them, rather than sell it. (The 
development of the Forrestal Campus by Princeton University is one of 
several recent examples.) Universities have developed research parks 
for at least three reasons: with the prospect of earning a positive rate 
of return, to ensure a supply of space for current and future university 
expansion, and to have a nearby site for the location of technology-
oriented private businesses that could help faculty develop and com-
mercialize inventions15 • This last motivation reflects a growing awa-
reness within the university that there are important opportunities for 
private sector-university cooperation in applied research and techno-
logy development (see, for example, Lynton and Elman, 1987; National 
Science Board, 1983; Gibson, 1988; Steinnes, 1987; Fairweather, 1989; 
and Feller, 1988). 
• Park Occupants. The last group of investments is by the organizations 
that locate within the parks. These investments are in infrastructure 
and buildings. The infrastructure that is provided includes water, se-
wer and gas hookups, telecommunications facilities ( e.g., microwave 
transmitters), and access roads, when they are not provided by others. 
Organizations that conduct R&D or light manufacturing with proces-
ses that use or produce hazardous materials also often construct their 
own containment facilities. Most organizations in research parks also 
construct their own buildings, either on land they own, or on land they 
have leased long-term. Organizations that lease space in buildings, eit-
her from the park or a management company, may retrofit the building 
to their own specifications. Alternatively, that retrofitting is done by 
the lessor. 
14From an interview with Alf Branden, former VicePresident for Business and Finance, 
and one of the architects of Stanford Research Park. Palo Alto, California, July 1988. 
15From interviews with officials at universities affiliated with the three case study research 
parks. 
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4 Expected Regional Development Outcomes 
We stated earlier that the large investments made in research parks that 
are summarized in the preceding section have been motivated by the belief 
that research parks induce technology-based regional economic growth. This 
perception is based mostly on casual observations (particularly of a few well-
known older parks) and anecdotal reports in the popular press. (For example, 
Alexander, 1977; Binyon, 1977; and Fairbanks, 1981.) 
In this section we provide a theoretical basis for the current interest in 
research parks. The planners and policy officials who advocate research park 
development generally are not aware of these theoretical arguments - at least 
not formally. However, elements of theory appear informally in planning and 
policy documents and in discussions of public objectives and purposes. 
Two different, but complementary, streams of regional development theory 
provide hypotheses about the impacts of research park investments on regio-
nal economic development. Growth ( or development) pole theory stresses 
the diffusion of growth and innovative activity from a center, or seedbed (the 
research park). Entrepreneurship theory often focuses on the attributes of 
a region that enhance its creativity and dynamism. (Goldstein and Luger, 
1989b, provide a more complete and critical discussion of these theories.) 
We discuss the full range of regional development impacts elsewhere 
(Ibid.). Here, we focus on employment generation and job quality. From 
growth and development pole theory we expect indirect employment genera-
tion through the mechanisms of backward linkages, forward linkages, intra-
corporate organizational linkages, and through the creation of localization 
economies. The theory predicts that backward linkages lead suppliers of 
equipment, materials, and business services to locate in proximity to the 
research park. Forward linkages should lead establishments that purchase 
R&D outputs to locate in proximity to the research park. A special forward 
linkage occurs when a corporation locates a manufacturing plant in proxi-
mity to its own R&D facility in order to increase the interaction of engineers 
with production managers. Other types of regional employment generation 
based on intracorporate linkages might be the decision to move a headquar-
ters function to the area of its principal R&D facility. Localization economies 
created by a research park lead to the growth of other R&D facilities in the 
region to take advantage of a specialized labor pool, and accessibility to other 
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research-based institutions already in the region (e.g. universities), technical 
and market information through proximity to R&D facilities of competing 
firms, and a social and cultural milieu created by the concentration of a 
highly educated work force. 
Entrepreneurship theory also stresses a type of localization economies. 
According to that theory, research park enterprises employ a highly crea-
tive work force that increases the overall innovativeness of the region. That 
creativity and innovativeness presumably attract venture capital and other 
entrepreneurs to the region. The culture of innovation then should build 
upon itself "synergistically," leading to business spinoff activity, new bu-
siness formations, and increased risk-taking. An infrastructure conducive to 
spawning and nurturing innovative activity should develop and help sustain 
the region's dynamism and adaptiveness into the future. 
5 The Impact of Research Parks on Regional 
Employment: Evidence 
Over 40 years ago, Howard Odum, a sociologist and regionalist at the Uni-
versity of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, was one of the first to hypothesize 
that research activity can stimulate the economic development of a region 
(Wilson, 1967). Odum had the South, and specifically North Carolina, in 
mind, and his ideas were heavily influential in the series of decisions that 
eventually led to the creation of the Research Triangle Park. 
Over time, economic development officials from all over the United States 
and from other parts of the world have come to treat Odum's hypothesis as an 
assumption. After visiting Research Triangle Park, Stanford, the University 
of Utah, and a small number of other established research parks, many of 
those officials returned home to set up their own parks; hence, the dramatic 
growth in the research park population. Unfortunately, park developers too 
often fail to account for unique local conditions, or even to assess whether 
any park can be justified in a benefit-cost sense. 
The principal question that we now need to address is whether, and under 
what conditions, Odum's hypothesis can be sustained. Specifically, can we 
expect research parks to achieve their intended regional development outco-
mes? 
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We first note that of the 110 research parks that now exist in the United 
States, twenty-four have no establishments and no employment; they exist 
only on paper. Franco (1985) has estimated that over 50 percent of all parks 
that are announced never become viable and go out of business. This ne-
arly happened to the Research Triangle Park. Of those parks that manage to 
stay in business, as many as 50 percent cease to operate primarily as research 
parks because they could not attract a suff.icient number of R&D laboratories. 
Instead, to maintain the park's viability as a real estate project, managers 
of these parks typically relax restrictions and allow general business, office, 
and/or manufacturing uses. This indicates that research parks are relatively 
risky investments. One out of every two that start up fail altogether. And 
approximately half of the remaining parks maintain viability only by chan-
ging their original mission. Hence, only around 25 percent of park start-ups 
continue in existence as planned. 
Even if a research park remains organizationally viable, it may not stimu-
late regional economic development beyond its direct contribution. That is 
the particular issue we investigate in this section. We proceed by summari-
zing two types of evidence about the indirect or induced employment effects 
of research park development: results from a case study of the Research 
Triangle Park, and results of quasi-experimental and econometric analyses 
of data from counties throughout the U.S. with and without research parks. 
Both of these confirm that the growth transmission process is more com-
plex and less regular than growth/ development or entrepreneurship theory 
predicts. 
5.1 The Case of the Research Triangle Park 
This case study is divided into a brief history of the Research Triangle Park 
and a discussion of the park's impact on the regional economy. (Sellars, 1989, 
provides an extensive history of the Research Triangle Park.) 
5.1.1 History 
In the mid-1950s, North Carolina had the second lowest per capita income 
of any state, and its employment base was concentrated in three low-wage, 
declining industries: tobacco, textiles, and furniture. There was little or no 
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R&D activity in the region except for that in the area's three research uni-
versities - the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, North Carolina 
State University, and Duke University. The combination of high quality pu-
blic universities and the lack of job opportunities for highly skilled scientists 
and engineers had led to a brain drain from the state of serious proportion. 
In 1955, Governor Luther Hodges formed a committee of the state's 
business leaders and prominent university officials to investigate how the 
strengths of the area's universities could be used to help restructure the 
state's economy. One year later, the committee produced a report that pro-
posed that the three research universities could attract a concentration of 
industrial research labs to the region to take advantage of the faculty ex-
pertise, that in turn would attract technology-based production facilities to 
surrounding parts of the state. It is noteworthy that this report did not 
envision a research park. Because only a few relatively new research parks 
existed at the time, the concept was not yet well-known. 
After two years, a retired industrialist from New York was recruited to 
invest in the concept proposed by the committee. He proposed to build a 
private research park on 4,000 wholly undeveloped acres near the center of 
the triangle formed by Chapel Hill, Raleigh, and Durham. However, he could 
not attract additional investors, in part, because of public skepticism about 
the general research park concept, and in part, because questions of propriety 
were being raised about the promotion of a private research park by public 
universities and other state government agencies. 
After a period of stagnation, a group of private citizens and civic-minded 
corporations bought out the stock of the (empty) private research park and 
formed the non-profit Research Triangle Foundation to govern the renamed 
Research Triangle Park. A $500,000 grant and gift of 180 acres in the middle 
of the park were used to create a non-profit contract research organization 
(the Research Triangle Institute) as the park's first occupant (Little, 1988). 
The park was slow in attracting additional organizations until 1965 when 
IBM bought a site for a major facility. Luther Hodges, who had gone from 
the governorship to Washington as John F. Kennedy's Secretary of Com-
merce, and Terry Sanford, who was then Governor, were instrumental in 
getting the National Institutes of Health to locate its National Institute of 
Environmental Health Sciences in the park as well. These occupants served 
as anchors; they amplified the attractiveness of the region, due to its concen-
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tration of research universities, to a string of R&D branch plants of major 
national and international corporations, and other federal government labs. 
The park grew slowly, but steadily over the next twenty-two years. By 1989, 
there were forty-one R&D enterprises in the park with an aggregate work 
force of over 30,000. A large majority of the enterprises are R&D branch 
plants of major corporations (rather than indigenous, home-grown busines-
ses) occupying large, expensive, and widely separated sites with stringent 
restrictions on their use. 
5.1.2 Impact 
To assess the regional development outcomes of the Research Triangle Park 
we collected information from the population of park enterprises and from 
a stratified random sample of enterprises outside the park but within the 
triangle region. The sample was drawn from enterprises, in selected industrial 
sectors, that had first located in the region after the park was created in 
195816• We asked the CEOs of the sample enterprises their perceptions of 
the park's influence on their organization's location decision, as well as on 
the economic development of the region, in general. 
First, one-third of the 36 respondents from organizations inside the park 
indicated that it was "unlikely" or "very unlikely" that they would have 
located in the region if the park itself had not existed. On the other hand, 
44.4 percent said that it was "likely" or "very likely" they would have located 
in the region even if the park had not existed. (The remainder answered 
"maybe".) "Proximity to the area's research universities" was given most 
often as the respondents' main reason for locating in the region. Other 
possible responses, including "the location of other corporate branches in 
the region," "a concentration of firms in the same or related industry sector" 
and "accessibility to input materials" were not mentioned as frequently as 
location determinants. 
To the question: "What, if anything, is important about the area univer-
sities to your organization¥" the most frequent responses were "access to 
graduating students for recruiting" and "access to faculty expertise." "Ad-
junct faculty appointments for staff scientists and engineers" and "access to 
16We used inputoutput tables to select the industrial sectors with the most active trading 
relationships with the types of organizations most commonly found within research parks. 
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university facilities and laboratories" were mentioned less often. 
The most important reasons cited by respondents for locating in the park 
rather than on sites outside the park, but within the region, were "the prestige 
of the park" and "the suitability and quality of the building site." "Access to 
ideas and creative people working in other park establishments" was not as 
frequent a response. This reply is consistent with other responses that reveal 
that scientists and engineers in more than 60 percent of park businesses have 
only "occasional" or "little" professional interaction with counterparts in 
other park enterprises. 
Of the sample of 148 enterprises located outside Research Triangle Park, 
40.9 percent said that the presence of the park was of "high" or "moderate" 
importance in choosing the region. The other 59.1 percent of the sample 
respondents said the park was only of "minor" or "no" importance. When 
asked: "Would you have located in the region if the park did not ezist?" 75 
percent of respondents answered "very likely" or "likely". Eight businesses 
(5. 7 percent of 140 responses) said it was "very unlikely" that they would 
have located in the region if the Research Triangle Park did not exist, and 
nine businesses (6.4 percent) said it was "unlikely." (12.9 percent answered 
"maybe".) Seventeen businesses answering "very unlikely" and "unlikely" 
seems like a small number. But, when it is projected to the entire triangle 
area business population it is not insignificant. Assuming the responses we 
received and the sample we drew are representative we can inflate the eight 
"very unlikely" answers by a factor of ten and the nine "unlikely" responses 
by a factor of five17 • Then, the induced number of businesses is 125 and 
the induced number of jobs is approximately 1700. This number, of course, 
is conservative, because it does not account for further rounds of induced 
business formation and job creation, by enterprises that interact with the 
businesses we surveyed outside the park. 
Finally, we asked the businesses outside Research Triangle Park if they 
would exist anywhere if the park had not been created, in order to ascer-
tain the net gain in economic activity that could be attributed to the park. 
17We drew a. oneinthree sample from the population and received ha.ck 30 percent of the 
questionnaires that were mailed. Therefore, the response rate is approximately 10 percent of 
the population. We in:lla.te the "unlikely" responses by ha.lfthis amount using the assumption 
that those respondents had twice the probability of locating in the region if the park did 
not exist. 
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Over 88 percent of the respondents said that it was either "very likely" or 
"likely." Again, three "very unlikely" and five "unlikely" responses are not 
large numbers, but when projected to the population, they inflate to 55 
businesses. These are enterprises, moreover, that most likely were created 
specifically to interact with park businesses. 
One can infer from these results that the Research Triangle Park has 
been responsible for inducing a considerable amount of technology-related 
employment in the region. Yet, park-induced growth accounts for less than 
twenty-five percent of the overall employment growth in technology-related 
businesses. We would conclude that the primary engine of economic de-
velopment in the region has not been the park itself, but the three research 
universities. 
5.2 Quasi-Experimental and Econometric Analyses 
We first addressed the counterfactual question: "Have research parks indu-
ced more growth in their regions than would have occurred without them?" 
by asking park managers how several outcomes would have differed if a re-
search park had not been created in their region. Of the 57 managers who 
responded, 49.1 percent said that their area's employment growth rate would 
have been "somewhat lower" and 12.3 percent said it would have been "much 
lower." Similarly, 31.6 percent said business start-ups would have been "so-
mewhat lower" while 14 percent said "much lower." 
While these responses are suggestive, their subjective basis raises some 
questions about validity; park managers are not disinterested observers. For 
that reason, we also employed a more objective quasi-experimental research 
design to answer the counterfactual question about park-induced employment 
growth. Specifically, we compared employment growth rates in counties with 
research parks to average employment growth rates in counties without rese-
arch parks, but with the same metropolitan status and population size, and 
within the same Census region. We use the employment growth rate as a 
proxy for the rate of economic development. 
We defined "economic development success/failure" in two ways: as a 
continuous measure equal to the difference between research park and control 
group counties' growth rates, and as a dichotomous measure which labels 
as a "success" any park in a county with a four year-average employment 
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Areas Areas 
with with no 
parks parks 
Metropolitan Area Population 
60,000 or less 2.29% 1.66% 
60,001-499,999 3.24% 3.34% 
500 ,000-999 ,999 3.47% 2.90% 
1,000,000 or more 2.87% 2.90% 
Presence of Research University 
No research university 3.29% 2.83% 
Type I research university 1.88% 2.77% 
Type II research university 2.82% 3.01% 
Type I and Type II are classifications given to research universities by the 
Carnegie Foundation, based on the volume of funded research and number of 
Ph.D.s awarded. Type I is a higher research classification than Type II. 
Table 1: Comparison of Employment Growth Rates in Areas With and Wi-
thout Parks, 1983-87 
growth rate equal to 120 percent or more of the four year-average employment 
growth rate in the control group of counties18 • (We used two measures of 
success/failure as a form of sensitivity analysis.) 
Table 1 contains the 1983-87 employment growth rate averages for coun-
ties with and without research parks, by metropolitan area population and 
type of nearby university. We discuss each in turn. 
• Metropolitan area population. Two groups of park counties appear to 
have grown faster than the control group - those with less than 60,001 
people and those with a population between 500,000 and 1,000,000. 
The first of these results is not surprising. In small metro areas, parks 
18We measured the employment growth rates between years t+ 1 and t+4, where t is the 
year the research park was established. 
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can serve the same function as a central business district: they can be 
a source of agglomeration economies that small places otherwise would 
lack. 
It also is not surprising to see an increase in average growth rates 
among areas with parks as population increases, at least for the first 
three size groups. Larger metro areas are more likely than smaller areas 
to have locational characteristics that park occupants find attractive, 
including good airports, cultural amenities, and large and diversified 
pools of available labor. The slower growth rate in the 1,000,000 or 
more category may indicate the onset of congestion. 
• Presence of research university. Areas that have research parks and 
universities grew more slowly than areas with research universities and 
no parks. And areas with parks and no universities grew faster than 
areas with neither a park nor a university. These results suggest that 
research parks play the same economic stimulus role as research uni-
versities, where universities do not exist. 
Table 2 uses the dichotomous measure of success/failure. The second co-
lumn therefore reports the number of cases in which the employment growth 
rate for counties with parks exceeded 120 percent of the employment growth 
rate for counties without parks. The third column reports the number of 
cases in which the opposite is true. 
In most instances, there is an even split between successes and failures. 
We see, again, that the number of successes is considerably greater for larger 
metropolitan areas than for smaller ones. For reasons we cannot explain, 
there are many more failures than successes in the 60,001 to 499,999 popu-
lation range. 
The difficulty we have interpreting some of the results in Tables 1 and 2 
could be due to the fact that we examine one source of variation at a time, 
without controlling for other effects. The standard way to avoid that problem 
is to employ multiple regression analysis. We did that, using both the conti-
nuous and dichotomous measures of success as dependent variables, and the 
following explanatory variables19: county type ( core?), deed restriction used? 
19These were not all used in the same regression models. Ten different models were run, 
some as ordinary least squares and some as logit. 
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No. of No. of 
successes failures 
Metropolitan Area Population 
60,000 or less 4 3 
60,001-499,999 3 11 
500,000-999,999 4 3 
1,000,000 or more 11 6 
Presence of Research University 
No research university 9 8 
Type I research university 3 4 
Type II research university 10 11 
Vintage 
1970s 8 8 
1980 and 1981 4 2 
1982 7 5 
1983 6 8 
Table 2: Research Park "Successes" and "Failures" 
government assistance used? non-metropolitan area? metropolitan area po-
pulation, manufacturing limited? park collects garbage? research university 
near? affiliated with research university? Type I research university near? 
age of park, percent floor space in incubators, and percent of space leased. 
Variables followed by a question mark were entered as yes/no dummies. The 
explanatory variables are either attributes of the region in which the park is 
located or attributes of the parks themselves. 
Five of the variables listed above were statistically significant in most 
of the models that were estimated20 : the age, or vintage of the park; the 
presence of a research university; the use of limitations on manufacturing 
activity; the use of deed restrictions; and the provision of garbage collection 
serVIces. 
20Complete regression results can be obtained from the authors. 
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• Park vintage. The older the park, the more likely that it has been 
successful. One reason is that the farther back in time we go, the fewer 
parks we find competing for a given number of private and government 
R&D labs. But perhaps more important is that the handful of parks 
that succeeded early were able to establish themselves as "meccas" of 
high technology. These areas pose formidable competition for areas 
with new research parks trying to establish themselves. 
• Presence of a research university. Having a leading (Type I) rese-
arch university within the same metropolitan area or non-metropolitan 
county of a research park had a negative effect on the relative employ-
ment growth rate differential. This surprising result may be interpreted 
as a local labor market phenomenon: leading research universities raise 
the local wage and salary levels so that manufacturing and other non-
R&D activity may be repelled. If this interpretation is true it has 
important implications for the type and quality of economic develop-
ment that is stimulated by R&D activity. Changes in the occupational 
distribution, mean income levels, and level of income inequality, for in-
stance, are more likely economic development outcomes than increases 
in the region's employment growth rate. 
If we assume that parks adjacent to research universities are more likely 
than other parks to have R&D businesses, as opposed to light manufac-
turing and other permitted uses, we could interpret this result to mean 
that strictly research-oriented activities lead to relatively small employ-
ment growth in the short-run. This interpretation is substantiated by 
the results for the next variable. 
• Limiting manufacturing and using deed restrictions. Of the attributes 
of the parks themselves, both the use of deed restrictions and limitati-
ons on manufacturing activity within the park have negative effects on 
the dependent variable. Again, R&D and other types of economic acti-
vity, particularly manufacturing, are not necessarily compatible in the 
same local labor market. And the "purer" the research park, the less 
economic activity - besides other R&D - the park is likely to attract. 
• Park-provided services. Finally, the provision of garbage collection by 
park management has a statistically significant positive effect on the 
18 
dependent variable. We interpret this to be a proxy for the perceived 
level of service provided by park management in general. Not surpri-
singly, the higher the level of service, the more businesses will want to 
locate in the park, and the more indirect job creation there will be. 
5.3 Summing Up the Evidence 
In this section we have presented several pieces of evidence about the "suc-
cess" of research parks, measured in terms of their ability to induce employ-
ment growth. We noted, first, that approximately half of all park start-ups 
fail as real estate ventures, and half of those that remain are converted from 
research to more general business parks. This latter group of parks may be 
successful as real estate ventures, but not as policy undertakings, since their 
original objective (i.e., to attract a critical mass of R&D activity) was not 
achieved. We showed, finally, that of the extant parks, only about half can 
be judged "successful" in terms of their ability to create jobs that otherwise 
would not have existed in the region. 
The case study of the Research Triangle Park indicates the magnitude of 
employment growth that is directly dependent on research park development. 
We estimated that at least 1700 jobs would not have been created outside the 
park if the park did not exist. Roughly half that number are in businesses 
that were established specifically to serve Research Triangle Park organizati-
ons. More generally, the businesses we surveyed in the triangle region, outside 
the park, cited proximity to the university - specifically its faculty and gra-
duates - as the most important feature of their location. Intra-corporate and 
forward linkages with park organizations were of secondary importance. 
Our quasi-experimental and econometric approaches indicate some of the 
critical factors necessary for parks to generate employment within their re-
gion. These factors can be summarized as: vintage, orientation, and ameni-
ties. Vintage refers to the date the park was established. Our results suggest 
that "the early bird gets the worm" since the probability of success is hig-
her for earlier parks than for later ones. The results also indicate that the 
research, versus manufacturing, orientation of a park affects the magnitude 
of employment generation. The more research-oriented a park is, as eviden-
ced by the use of land use restrictions and the type of university affiliation, 
the fewer jobs it will create in the region. Finally, our results suggest that 
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amenities matter. All else equal, businesses favor research parks that provide 
essential services. The more popular parks are as location sites, the greater 
employment creation there is, both within and outside the park. 
6 Conclusions 
The evidence presented above has implications for both theory and policy. 
The conclusion we draw for theory is that research parks do not behave as a 
classic growth/ development pole in larger regions that contain research uni-
versities, since backward, forward, and lateral linkages do not play a major 
role in the generation of employment in those areas. The universities them-
selves are the growth poles, and localization economies, rather than linkages 
based on material inputs and outputs, provide most of the growth stimulus. 
In regions without research universities and in smaller metropolitan areas 
that otherwise lack the basis for agglomeration economies, research parks 
can serve as a growth/ development pole. But the strength of the pole in 
those instances depends on the critical factors mentioned above - vintage, 
orientation, and amenities - as well as on intangibles, including good fortune 
and wise and effective leadership. 
The policy lesson we draw from this analysis is that research parks will 
not be wise investments in many regions. The "success" rate among all parks 
that are announced is relatively low. And, to the extent that vintage matters, 
it is too late for regions contemplating parks to "get in on the ground floor." 
Research parks will be most successful in helping to stimulate economic 
development in regions that already are richly endowed with the resources 
that attract highly educated scientists and engineers. That is not to say that 
regions with less rich endowments can not have a high-technology future, but 
more basic and long-term investments in improving public and higher edu-
cation, environmental quality, and residential environments will be needed 
first. 
Finally, we need to remember that research parks, when successful, will 
attract additional R&D activity to a region, primarily. The number of new 
job opportunities will tend to be highly skewed to the professional and ma-
nagerial end of the occupational distribution, while many of those who will 
get the new jobs may be recruited from outside the region. The surroun-
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ding regions, rather than being the recipients of new manufacturing activity 
drawn to these areas because of the research park, ironically may suffer its 
own brain-drain, assuming they have a supply of qualified labor. 
In light of this conclusion, state or local government officials considering 
a new research park should conduct a careful and sober feasibility assessment 
based upon a clear and specific set of objectives. There is no single formula for 
success, although there are factors that make the chances of success higher. 
If a decision to create a research park is made, government leaders should be 
prepared to invest liberally, and all other stakeholders should be prepared to 
wait a number of years before the investment is returned. 
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